According to Adam Pitman, both China and India often failed to acknowledge that Bangladesh has an array of economic partners, limiting the relevance of the zero-sum thought experiment

A new generation of Bangladeshis are defining their country. They came of age in the 2013 Shahbagh protests. They started working amid unprecedented growth. Now they’re setting out their values.

This generation makes up a third of the population.

Women that entered the workforce have their sights set on equality and empowerment. Graduates are finding jobs at aid agencies and tech companies. Start-ups are creating new market opportunities.

Dhaka is scrambling for trade and investment from across the world.

It’s rare to open a newspaper in Bangladesh and not find stories about the country's future. Yet these stories rarely make it outside the country. And when they do, they are reframed as esoteric questions about the country’s development or foreign relations – often from an Indocentric perspective.

Increasingly, though, efforts to repurpose Bangladesh have proven out of touch. And it’s reached an inflection point. India isn’t dealing with the Bangladesh it used to know.

The under-construction Padma Bridge on the mighty Padma  River | Syed Zakir Hossain/Dhaka Tribune

This came into sharp focus when commentators began framing Bangladesh’s relationship with China as a problem for India. Their rhetoric questioned Dhaka’s decision-making and Bangladeshis’ loyalties. But more than anything, it showed that many couldn’t rationalize the country Bangladesh has become.

Indo-China relationship

The media’s news cycle started just over a year ago.

On April 17, 2020, India announced restrictions for investment from China. Just over two weeks later, on May 5, the first border clashes occurred between Chinese and Indian troops.

China’s existential threat had become tangible for many in India.

The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh was ready for the front. Protesters burned effigies. Resident welfare associations boycotted Chinese made goods. Delhi’s Defence Colony declared war. It marked an intensification of anti-China sentiment that surfaced following the Covid-19 outbreak.

The media in India soon dragged Bangladesh into the fray.

A trade concession from China became a sign that Bangladesh was tilting away from India. The symbolism of diplomatic events legitimized fears that China would encircle India. Old news about China’s trade, investments and contracts with Bangladesh resurfaced as threats to India.

None of the speculation was substantiated. But it muddied the water sufficiently.

Global publishers produced headlines that ranged from sophomoric (“Two-timing – As Bangladesh’s relations with India weaken, ties with China strengthen”) to suspect (“Can China and Pakistan profit as Bangladesh turns from India?”) and severe (“China’s economic clout chills Bangladesh-India relations”).

Some journalists engaged in circular reporting. They repeated claims made by others without scrutiny. Others interviewed experts who described the media echo chamber as geopolitical competition. They conflated public discourse with real events.

Many feel Indian companies should be more involved in projects that showcase Bangladesh’s rise | Syed Zakir Hossain/Dhaka Tribune

Commentators had a field day.

What Beijing’s relationship with Dhaka meant for New Delhi had remained an open question for years. But the question took on a new urgency in light of the military crisis in Ladakh. Whether Beijing would use trade and investment to influence Dhaka for strategic gain became a focal point.

‘Debt trap diplomacy’

Few explained how this could be achieved. Those who tried referenced the debt trap diplomacy theory, explicitly or implicitly. The theory has clouded thinking in Bangladesh for years.

According to this theory, Beijing convinced Dhaka to sign loans Bangladesh couldn’t afford. Beijing would then use its loans to influence Dhaka’s decision-making, or even seize infrastructure.

It looks far-fetched in plain English. But that’s what debt trap diplomacy means.

The term is most commonly used as a dog whistle by experts or officials interviewed by journalists. It’s hard to substantiate though. Journalists end up describing projected investment figures, or high-profile infrastructure projects, lending credence to theory’s narrative logic.

This creates a false balance between speculation and research that has debunked the theory. There may be many good reasons to worry about China. But debt trap diplomacy isn’t one. Let alone in Bangladesh, where Dhaka has, understandably, not borrowed more than it can afford.

It’s not clear why so many bou